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Reform Initiatives for 'Iraq 
and the Middle East: The 
Search for What Works 
Robert Looney* 
The Iraqi people are entrepreneurs. That's the good news. The bad 
news is that there is no economic system in the country. Everyone 
seems to have overlooked this. 1 :John Hulsman, Heritage Foundation 
We inherited a corrupted and bad economy. It was a mafia economy 
rather than a market economy. We are trying to rebuild the new Iraq on 
a solid basis.2 -Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Iraqi Finance Minister 
Introduction 
Leading up to the war and especially after the swift military defeat of 
Saddam Hussein's regime, optimism was running high among many 
Iraqis and American planners that the country would be quickly trans-
formed into a free nation with a liberalized economy. Yet even after the 
June 28, 2004 transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government, 
the obstacles to these goals loom larger than ever. The insurrection is 
taking a huge toll of U.S. troops, Iraqi citizens, foreign aid workers and 
diplomats. The insurgent's aim is to sabotage economic reconstruction 
and the building of democratic institutions that could make Iraq a 
showcase for neighboring Arab countries that have drifted listlessly in 
*Robert E. Looney, Ph.D., is a professor of economics, and Associate 
Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He has written twenty books on vari-
ous aspects of development together with articles appearing in a number of 
scholarly journals. 
'Quoted in David Lazarus, "Iraq Won't be Paying for Itself," San Francisco 
Chronicle,June 30, 2004, Cl. 
2Quoted in Paul Wiseman, "Iraq to Get New Start With Bond Market," USA 





repressive backwardness. 3 
U.S. hopes to bring economic gains and democracy to the Middle 
East and North Africa region as a whole have also been thwarted. The 
original idea of revitalizing the region arose in response to September 
11th and the growth of Islamic extremism. It was then that the 
Americans began to realize that due to the lack of democracy and free-
dom, economic stagnation and widespread unemployment were driv-
ing many young people in the Middle East and North Africa towards 
extremism and terrorism. The existence of pro-American, yet auto-
cratic regimes was no longer a guarantee for lasting stability: But since 
the time a first draft of the reform plan for economic and political lib-
eralization, dubbed the Greater Middl'e East Initiative (GMEI),4 was 
leaked in February 2004, the Arab reaction has been less than enthusi-
astic. 
Many of the generalities found in the popular press concerning the 
wisdom and viability of U.S. backed Middle East reforms are of little 
value in assessing the likelihood of a positive outcome - individual, 
detailed case studies are needed to provide a more realistic insight into 
the scope and magnitude of the ~ that confront both the United 
States and like-minded regional leiders. 
In this regard, despite all of its difficulties, Iraq still remains a valid 
case for examining the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. initiated 
reforms. Needless to say, the post-Saddam economy is not off to a good 
start. At the end of June 2004 Iraq's unemployment was estimated at 
ranging anywhere from 30 to 70 percent, 5 and one out of six Iraqis still 
depended on the rationing system. Yearly per capita income dropped 
from around $3,600 in the 80s to $970 following the Gulf War in 1990, 
then to $420 at the present time. 
john Hughes, "Whispers of Democracy Across the Middle East," Christian 
Science Monitor, October 22, 2003. 
'For a description of this initiative as welf as its successor the Broader Middle 
East Initiative (BMEI) see Robert Looney, "The Broader Middle East 
Initiative: Requirements for Success in the Gulf," Strategic Insights, August, 
2004. 
5Ahmedjanabi, "Iraqi Unemployment Rate Reaches 70 Percent," 






H h f this sad state of affairs can be attributed to the reforms 
ow muc o d b th C ai· · 
· sti·on In Iraq the U.S. reforms decree y e o ition is an open que . ' 2003 
Pr · · al A thority (CPA) began appearing in the summer of , 
OVISIOn U ) · · · th · {Independence of the Central Bank, June 2003 culmmating m ~ wm-
ter of that year - rules for foreign investment. Cle~ly the reforms mtro-
duced by the CPA are intended to nudge and gmde Iraq down a cer-
tain path. ' · . ·d 
Needless tO say if the security situation doe~ not nnp:ove con~1 er-
ahly, efforts to rebuild the economy wi~ be frui.tless. Yet rmprovements 
in the economy are critical for dampemng the msurgency. . 
Last week a former senior security adviser in the occupation author-
ity told the Senate Foreign Relati~ns C~:Umitte~ that a ~ey reason 
Iraqis haven't cooperated with the coalition ~~st the 1~urgenc! 
has been resentment over the lack of progress m nnprovmg condi-
tions and solving 'Ullemployment.6 • • • 
On the assumption that the Interim Government makes Significant 
progress in the security area, the following sectio~ assess whether the 
current Interim Government and its successors will be able to draw ~n 
the country's reform efforts to date as a means of initiating econormc 
prosperity and perhaps eventual democr~cy. As for ~er ~ef~rms, ar_e 
there any good role models for the Iraqi s to follow m designmg therr 
development strategy? Based on the transition economies of Eastern 
and Central Europe's experience, several areas of reform effort are 
identified as critical if Iraq is to make significant progress to~ards 
becoming a modern, dynamic economy in a relatively democratic set-
ting. Drawing on these results, a final section draws some lessons for 
the GMEI countries as a whole. 
The CPA Reforms 
On May 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). is~~d 
Regulation 1, assigning itself "all executive legislative ~d .J~dic1al 
authority necessary to achieve its objectives." In this capacity 1t issued 
around 100 orders, memoranda and regulations that will serve as ~e 
main constraints on Iraqi policymakers until elections are held ~ 
December 2005. Some orders address liberal free market economic 
6Quoted in Hannah K. Strange, "Iraqi Reconstruction Flawed, Say Experts," 





policies to be implemented, while others are mainly administrative. 
Their scope is broad in addressing such diverse areas as: banking, the 
media, de-Baathification, nongovernmental organizations, traffic, pro-
curement, intellectual property, elections and the judiciary. To assure 
implementation of the orders, Ambassador Bremer appointed, with five 
year terms, key individuals in the country's relevant ministries. 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Orders 
The Orders are exercised pursuant to the Iraqi interim constitution, 
the Transitional Administration Law (TAL). The Annex to the TAL 
states that the Orders can only, be ove~ed with the approval of the 
president, the two vice presidents and a majority of the ministers. More 
iJvportantly the Annex limits the Interim Govemmentfrom taking "any 
, actions affecting Iraq's destiny" beyond the election of an Iraqi govern-
ment. The identical sentence appears in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1546, which outlines Iraq's transition to full sovereignty. 
Orders pertaining explicitly to the economy are extremely encom-
passing. 
Order #39 - Foreign Investment: assists in transitioning Iraq "from 
a ... centrally planned economy to a market economy." The Order per-
mits the following: {I) privatization of Iraq's 200 state-owned enterpris-
es; (2) 100 percent foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses; {3) "national 
treatment" of foreign firms; (4) unrestricted, tax-free remittance of all 
profits and other funds; and (5) 40-ye.ar ownership licenses. 
Order #40 - The Banking Sedor: transforms the banking sector 
from a state-run to a market-driven system. It allows foreign banks to 
enter the Iraqi market and to purchase up to 50 percent of Iraqi banks. 
Order #49 - Taxes: reduces the tax rate on corporations from a 
high of 40 percent to a flat rate of 15 percent. The income tax rate is also 
capped at 15 percent. 
Order #12 - Trade: suspends ~all tariffs, customs duties, import 
taxes, licensing fees and similar surcharges for goods entering or leav-
ing Iraq, and all other trade restrictions that may apply to such goods." 
Order #17 '\ - Foreign Contractors: grants foreign contractors, 
including private security firms, full immunity from Iraq's laws. 
Order #n - Auditing: establishes the Board of Supreme Audit and 
named its president and his two deputies. The Board oversees inspec-
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ment contracts, audit classified programs and prescribe regulations and 
procedures. 
Order #57 - Inspectors: creates and appoints an inspector within 
every Iraqi ministry to five-year terms. These inspectors have the 
authority to perform audits, write policies and have full access to all 
offices, materials and employees of the ministries. 
In late June 2004 as he was about to leave his post Ambassador 
Bremer noted that "Iraq has been fundamentally changed for th~ bet-
ter." He noted that "among his biggest accomplishments ... were the 
lowering of Iraq's tax rate, the liberalization of foreign investment laws 
and the reduction of import duties.m 
Clearly, the Bremer Orders fund~entally altered Iraq's economic 
system. It has transf onned. it from a closed Baathist statist model8 to 
one of the more open, nee-liberal economies in the developing world.9 
Unfortunately, what ,seemed to be the appli~ation of sound economic 
principles to Americans often came across as a radical intrusion by 
many Iraqis. As one observer has noted: 
Even textbook-perfect economic reforms will not lead to sustained 
economic growth or an open Iraqi economy unless Iraqis own the 
process - especially if sovereignty is to have any real meaning. 10 
The same applies to the power assigned to independent regulators 
that will drastically reduce the power of Iraqi government ministries. 
For instance one report suggested that these regulators were likely to 
prevent the Communications Ministry from canceling licenses the 
coalition awarded to foreign-managed consortia to operate three 
mobile networks and the national broadcaster. Apparently interference 
ofthis sort is a major source of Iraqi ill will. 11 
7Quoted in john B.judis, "Talking Points Memo" Iraq's Economy," Occupation 
l*.ztch,June 23, 2004. 
8Cf. Robert Looney, "A return to Baathist Economics? Escaping vicious 
Circles in Iraq," Strategic Insights Quly 2004), 
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/jul/looneyjul04.asp>. . 
9Robert Looney, "Iraq's Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and its 
Role," The Middle Eastjourna~ 57:4, (Autumn 2003), pp. 568-587. " . 
ioBathsheba Crocker, "The Economy: With Money Comes Power, Washington 
Post,June 20, 2004, bl. 





There is some controversy over how much power the Interim 
Government has to overturn or modify these orders. No doubt the pro-
visional government will be able to exercise some control over the 
denµls of implementation. Most concede, however, that changing the 
fundamental laws or the essential character of the neo-liberal economic 
policies they facilitate is quite another matter. Ambassador Bremer 
characterized the orders: "You set up these things and they begin to 
develop a certain life and momentum on their own - and it's harder to 
reverse course. "12 
A long uphill struggle lies ahead for the Iraqi interim government A 
number of pressing policy choices need to be made which include cre-
ating job opportunities for the unemployed, stimulating the private sec-
tor, establishing a social safety net, rehabilitating the agricultural sector 
and integrating it within the reconstruction priorities, guaranteeing sta-
ble food supplies and finding the adequate funding for all these tasks. 33 
The critical question is whether within the context of the Orders an 
economic strategy can be developed in keeping with the country's pri-
orities and interests. H the Orders ,..are overly constraining and Iraqi 
needs not met, the legality14 of the·Orders may come into question and 
valuable time will be lost in the restoration of the economy. 
Fiscal Operations· ... 
As . noted above, the Orders place several constraints on the fiscal 
operations of the authorities: ··.~ 
Taxes. As noted above, Order #49 limits the highest tax bracket at 
15 percent, a rate lowered considerably from the official prewar rate. As 
a result, during 2004 Iraqi officials expect to collect only $5 million 
worth of personal income taxes and nothing in corporate taxes. 
Bonds. Other constraints on the Interim Government's finances 
involve treatment of past government domestic debt and constraints on 
the official borrowing from the Iraqi Central Bank. On June 4, 2004 
U.S. administrator Paul Bremer signed the public debt law. This new 
statute stipulates that the Iraqi government will be required to honor all 
12Qioted in Ra)iv Chandrasekaran and Walter Pincus, "US. Edicts Curb 
Power of Iraq's Leadership," Washington Post., June 27, 2004, p. 1. 
13Henry Azzaro, "Security is the Major Constraint Hindering Business Activity 
and Economic Repound in Iraq," Jordan Times,July 25, 2004. 
uSome jurists contend that the Orders violate the Hague regulations of 1907. 
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of its previous domestic debts to Iraq's commercial banks - debts large-
1 contracted by Saddam Hussein. This "Saddam Paper" is estimated to 
:e around 1,300 billion dinars. The public debt law can therefore be 
seen as a way to bring funds back into Iraq's banking sector, much o: 
which would otherwise face bankruptcy due to insolvency. The Iraqi 
Central Bank also holds about $2.5 billion in Iraqi government debt 
Under the Bond Market Plan put together by Paul Bremer that debt 
must be paid as it matures.15 • 
The Coalition Provisional Authority {CPA) also passed a law m 
January 2004 that created the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) as an inde-
pendent bank, meaning the government cannot force the bank to buy 
its paper as was done under Saddam. 
Given these domestic debt servicing obligations as well as a cash 
shortage, the Interim Government is attempting to ~ev~lop a do1:1:Stic 
bond market as an additional source of finance. Iraq s Fmance Mimster 
Adel Mahdi noted that "It's a way to recover·the economy. We are issu-
ing new treasury bills not only to finance the repayment of treasury bills 
outstanding from the former regime, but to regulate the market and 
determine interest rates." On July 18, 2004 the Central Bank of Iraq 
raised about 150 billion dinars {$103m) for the government, selling 
three month bonds. 
The bonds offered a market determined interest rate of between 5 and 
8 percent, not enough to entice foreign banks, given the political risks 
involve. Instead, the vast majority of the buyers were local banks and 
the auction was a first step in laying the groundwork for further bor-
rowing. Three-inonth bonds were chosen for their short maturity, allow-
ing the government to prove that it is credit-worthy. It plans to issue six 
month and one-year bonds later in 2004, hopefully raising as much as 
$1.2 billion by the end of the year. It is expected that the development 
of a government debt market will introduce another constraint on the 
government - if it overspends the way Saddam did, investors will 
demand higher interest rates. 
Privatization. Even though the energy sector is exempt, privatiza-
tion of Iraqi industry is probably the most controversial of the U.S. pro-
posed reforms (Order #39). U.S. officials saw privatization as part of 
15Paul Wiseman, "Iraq to Get New Start with Bond Market," USA Today, July 




the broader conservative economic agenda that Reagan had endorsed 
in the 1980s. 16 The supply-side tax cuts - increasing profitability, and 
the elimination of import duties - lowering costs were to complement 
the privatization of Iraqi state-owned enterprises {SO Es). 
The state still controls almost all large businesses in Iraq. The 61 
major industries under the Ministry of Industry and Minerals account 
for 90 percent of Iraq's industrial production, including oil, leather 
goods and textiles. At the time the Interim Government assumed 
power most SOEs were in dire straits, with just the oil and cement 
industries profitable. 17 State-run enterprises brought in $73 million in 
revenue in the first five months of 2004, but paid out $85 million in 
salaries alone, much of it to employees not working -- about two-thirds 
of the workforce is redundant. More than half the state-owned compa-
1 nies are not operating and the remainder is functioning at a fraction of 
its capacity. 
Clearly something needs to be done. On the surface, privatization 
would appear to off er an ideal solution to these problems. The central 
rationale for privatization is that, left to its devices, a privately owned 
enterprise is by definition :more efficient that its publicly owned coun-
terpart. This general proposition has been borne out by numerous 
empirical studies of privatization programs around the world. 18 In Iraq's 
case the government would receive needed revenues from the sale, and 
divest itself of the on-going drain of subsidies. The firms would receive 
needed technology and capital. .;." 
A closer look, however, suggests the difficulties that would face any 
new owner are likely to dampen interest for some time. The State 
Company for Woolen Industries19 provides a useful illustration. The 
company has power generators that can keep equipment running even 
when Baghdad's electricity supply shuts down. Two of the factories were 
16Cf. Robert Looney, "Reaganomics," in R.nutledge Encyclopedia of International 
Political Economy, ed. RJ. Barry Jones (London: Routledge, 2001), Volume 3, 
pp. 1310-1313. 
11Doug Struck, tEngines of Industry Sputtering in Iraq," Washington Post, July 
10, 2004. 
1gSummarized in William Megginson and Jeffrey Netter, "From State to 
Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic 
Literature, XXXIX:2, 0une 2001), pp. 321-389. 
19This section draws heavily on Doug Struck, "Engines of Industry Sputtering 







looted or bombed, but the five functioning plants are running only one 
shift out of three per day. Schedules are juggled to try to keep the 3,700 
employees working at least a few shifts a week; all are being paid full 
salaries. 
A major source of the firm's difficulties stems from the fact that the 
U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority arbitrarily doubled worker 
salaries to reduce unrest when it took over in April 2003. That huge 
increase in operating costs makes the company's wool blankets, t~nts 
and clothing much more expensive than imports which are now enter-
ing the country essentially duty free as a result of Order * 12. As one fac-
tory manager lamented: 
We can't sell out products on the local market. Our prices are too 
high-It's good to have better salaries for our workers. People need 
to feed their families, but it's a disaster for the company - the out-
put is just piling up unsold in warehouses.~ 
Other state owned companies have no capital to get equipment or 
income to buy parts. Materials suppliers reuse to overhaul Iraq's ban-
dit-ridden roads. In addition many Iraqi workers have little motivation 
to go back to work if their salaries are still being paid.21 
Given the current situation in Iraq, privatization at this time would 
appear to be an ineffective tool to address the country's pressing prob-
lems. The security situation makes it impossible to arrive at fair value 
bids, and the high unemployment rate negates wholesale restructuring 
for efficiency gains. 
The Post-CPA Period 
Before turning over power to the Interim Government the CPA 
shelved its privatization plans. Even as early as December 2003 the ini-
tiatives touted by the CPA to fashion Iraq into a secular, pluralistic, mar-
ket-driven nation was put on hold. "The Americans are coming to 
understand that they cannot change everything that they want to 
change in Iraq," noted Adel Abdel-Mehdi, the current Interim 
Government finance minister, "They need to let the Iraqi people decide 
the big issues. "22 
20Quoted in Doug Struck, "Engines of Industry Sputtering in Iraq," Washington 
Post,July 10, 2004. 
21Doug Struck, "Engines of Industry Sputtering in Iraq," Washington Post, July 
10, 2004. 
22Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ''Attacks Force Retreat from Wide-Ranging Plans for 
Iraq," Washington Post, December 28, 2003. 
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Critics of the CPA's reforms feel that in the face of continued insur-
gency, the absence of electrical power and of elementary safety on the 
city streets, that the focus should not have been placed on economic lib-
eralization. If not the liberalization program laid out in the various 
orders then what for the Interim Government? A return to Baathist 
' 
economics, abandoning the market economy?23 An East-Asia export 
oriented model stressing domestic demand management for full 
employment?24 
Undertaking a full scale shift in development strategy makes little 
sen5e until an elected Iraqi government is in place. Perhaps for this rea-
son, . the Interim Government has shown little inclination to deviate 
markedly from the path laid out by the CPA. As a possible prelude to 
, future privatization programs under an elected Iraqi government, the 
interim government hopes to start leasing-out some of the struggling 
state-owned firms as a means of attracting much needed investment 25 
The assumption behind leasing is that potential investors are more 
likely to invest in factories that are already operational and don't 
require major improvements. Ho~ever, because of the high unemploy-
ment rate, investors would be required to avoid laying off large num-
bers. One plan is to offer leases to foreign and local companies through 
temporary contracts that could last as long as 15 years. Leasing would 
allow investors to run individual factories as joint ventures and share 
profits.26 
The Interim Government has a}so implemented a CPA initiated pro- · 
gram - the revamping of the old Baghdad Stock Exchange. The new 
Iraq Stock Exchange opened on June 24, 2004. It was the product of 
more than a year's work on a regulatory framework undertaken by 12 
brokerage firms and banks who share joint ownership. The Iraq Stock 
Exchange has 27 companies with about 100 t? go public before the fall 
23Robert Looney, "A Return to Baathist Economics?" Strategic Insights, July 
2004. 
24As described in Robert Looney, "Thaksinomics: A New Asian Paradigm?" 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 29:1(Spring2004), pp.65-86. ·.'. 
25Edmund Blair, "Iraq to Lease State Plants to Foreigners," Reuters,July 12, 
2004. 
26Todd Pitman, "With Plan to Lease State-Run Factories, Iraqi Minister Says 
Insecurity Hindering Efforts to Attract Foreign Investment," Associated Press, 




with a total of 180 to 200 expected by the end of the year.27 In just five 
sessions, trading volume has nearly quadrupled and the value of some 
stocks has surged more than 600 percent 28 
The old stock exchange comprised only Iraqi companies and traders, 
while the new bourse will eventually be accessible to foreigners. The 
key to the exchange's success is a strong regulat~ry trru:1ework, tran_s-
parency and ~ccountability. A shift to an electromc trading system will 
be introduced in the near future. ... . 
Hopefully the stock market will begin to lure ~oney ~ack fro~ Iraqis 
citizens living overseas. What better way to bmld national pnde or a 
symbol of capitalism working in the new Iraq than creating a stock 
exchange?29 
Failure of CPA Reforms? 
As noted above the·U.S. sponsored reforms. have come under intense 
criti~ism both in and outside of Iraq. Much of this criticism has been 
directed at the deplorable state of unemployment While the CPA 
reforms may account for some of this job loss, other factors appear to 
account for the bulk of the country's joblessness. As in the above 
Woolen Industry example, looking at job loss in a plant that can't com-
pete because of free trade imports gives you one picture - a mi:r~o­
nomic explanation. Looking at the larger picture that reflects JOb JOSS 
due to insufficient demand - the macro explanation, gives you an 
. -
entirely different perspective. 
After the fall of Saddam's government, Ambassador Bremer and the 
Governing Council decreed the top three levels of the Baath party 
membership could not be on the government payroll. Estimates vary, 
but a safe guess is that more than 120,000 people lost their jobs. Some 
were diehard Saddam loyalists, but many others were doctors, nurses, 
university professors and other professionals who argued that they had 
joined the Baath Party simply to obtain their jobs or to receive promo-
tions or advance their careers, not out of ideology or loyalty to 
9)eborah Haynes, "Iraq Stock Exchange Poised to Rally in japan' of the 
Middle East," Agence France Presse,July 16, 2004. 
28'farek Wl-Tablawy, "With Pen and Sweat, Brokers Push Iraq Stock Exchange 
to New Highs," Boston Globe,July 18, 2004. 
29Cheryl Glaser, "Reviving Baghdad Stock Exchange Will Help Democracy," 







Saddam.30 Not only were their productive services lost, but their 
reduced or lost incomes resulted in slack demand for consumer goods, 
throwing many workers in those sectors out of work. Belatedly, in April 
of 2004 after much of the damage was one, Ambassador Bremer 
reversed the much criticized de-Baathification policy and noted that 
many laid-off Baathist teachers would be eligible to regain their jobs 
through a newly streamlined appeals process. 31 
Employment also fell after the war as a result of the CPA's controver-
sial decision in Late May to disband the army. When the war ended, 
the army consisted of about 500,000 or about 7 percent of the labor 
force. The coalition would later pay stipends to former soldiers, but the 
decision to put them back on the streets without jobs has been blamed 
for the increase in insurgency. 32 
Delays in reconstruction have also taken a toll in jobs. Seven months 
after. Congress approved the largest foreign aid package in history to 
rebuild Iraq, less than 5 percent of the $18.4 billion had been spent 33 
By late May 2004 the pace of expenditure appeared to be picking up, 
und~r Con~essional pressµre. 34 However, by then, the damage to 
Iraqi good will caused by the un~pd'ressed unemployment situation was 
more than apparent 
Reconstruction contracting is also responsible for the small amount of 
job cre~ti.~n in Iraq. In principle Iraqi companies were to be secondary 
beneficiaries of the $18.4 billion in aid allocated for reconstruction by 
the U.S - they were to be given pri?rity in the sub-contracting bidding, 
although firms from a list of sixfy-nine coalition countries could also 
bid. As _it tun:ied ou~ Iraqi companies were at a distinct disadvantage in 
competing with foreign finns because they did not have the capital, nor 
*Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Generals Criticize Ban on Employing Es-Baathists" 
International Herald Tribune, April 21, 2004. ' 
31~i<:11olas Riccardi, "Iraqi Teachers 4am Hard Political Lesson: Hussein's 
Victims and Baath Party Members Compete for Lucrative and Limited 
~ositi~ms," Los Angeles Tf":es, May 14, 2004, AlO. 
Christopher _Foote, William Block, Keith Crane and Simon Gray 
"Economic Policy as Prospects in Iraq," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
~blic Policy Discussion Paper No. 04-1, May 4, 2004, p.11. · , ' 
Jonathan Weisman and Ariana Cha, "Rebuilding Aid Unspent, Tapped to 
Pay Expenses," Washington Post, April 30, 2004 AL 3'Rob~rt O'Harrow, "U.S. Finally Spending Ir;q Construction Funds " 
Washington Post, May 25, 2004, All. ' 
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could they obtain the necessary financing from the country's primitive 
banking system. 35 
As a result, reconstruction projects are simply not getting enough 
money into the hands of entrepreneurial Iraqis and large segments of 
the Iraqi workforce. By May 2004 fewer than 25,000 Iraqis were work-
ing on projects funded by the U.S. "tempering expectations that more 
than $18 billion in American spending would jump-start Iraq's econo-
my and triggera surge in goodwill towards the United States."36 
As noted above, most Iraqi companies are not able to take advantage 
of reconstruction jobs becau8e of lack of credit Whether these midsize 
businesses succeed or fail with their job creating expansions is critical 
for stability. Again, delays in restoring the country's banking and finan-
cial system are severely limiting the economy's recovery. 
Belatedly, to address the private sector's dire credit needs the CPA 
has begun (May 2004) accepting applications for a new program 
designed to provide loans of $500,000 to $5 nilllion for midsize com-
panies. However as of early June 2004 the program was still not for-
mally approved.37 Under other programs the coalition has distributed 
about $7.5 million in "microfinance" credits, typically loans averaging 
$2,500 for small businesses such as bakeries and grocery stores. An 
additional $17.5 million is in the pipeline for that effort 38 Again, these 
amounts are dwarfed by the country's needs. An expansion of this pro-
gram might be the most productive and least cost way of making a sig-
nificant dent in the country's massive unemployment 
In sum, the causes of Iraq's current economic malaise have their ori-
gins in a series of CPA miscalculations. Too many decisions were made 
without examining or at least acknowledging the ~conomic dimension. 
While the reforms are an easy target for assigning blame, they are only 
a small source of the problem. 
35 Ali B. Al-Shouk, "CPA Prepares Iraqi Finns for Reconstruction 
Subcontracts," Iraq Today, December 29, 2003. 
36Matt Kelly, "Fewer than 25, 000 Iraqis Working on Reconstruction Funded 
by U.S.," Associated Press, Mary 19, 2004. 




There's no financial policy, because there's been no government. 
And as yet we have no idea what will happen now [with a sovereign 
Iraqi govemment].39 - Abduljaber Al-Rubaie, Managing Director, 
Industrial Union Investment Bank 
This quote pretty much sums up the sentiment of the Iraqi business 
community in the period soon after the formation of the interim gov-
ernment. The previous sections suggest that the Interim Government 
without much fanfare is essentially staying the course, perhaps hoping 
that with a number of new construction projects coming on line nnem-
ployment will coine under control and with that a lessening of the insur-
gency. With an improvement in security, increases in aid flows should 
follow thus facilitating more reconstruction expenditures and job cre-
ation. 
What is happening here is just a phase and the bad news is being 
exaggerated. But the biggest problem is security ... Once the securi-
ty situation is improved, as we hope it will under the new govern-
ment, the economy will take off.40 - Ismael Al Bahrani, Managing 
/' 
Director, Bahrani Group ··· 
Clearly this is wishful thinking, grounded in little or no economic the-
ory or empirical support. Economic miracles do happen, however, 
with reforms in post-war West Germany, together with the Marshall 
Plan;11 often cited as a model for Iraq. No doubt, the German experi-
ence provided the inspirationJor many of the CPA's reforms noted 
above: 
After World War II, the first economic miracle was brought about 
by Ludwig Erhard's reforms in West Germany, which began in 
1948. Tariffs were greatly reduced, price controls were abolished, 
and the exchange rate of the new deutschemark was fixed to the 
dollar, which in turn was tied to gold. Income tax rates were slashed 
from 95 percent on incomes above $15,000 at the time of the Allied 
occupation to a maximum of 53 percent on income of $250,000 in 
the early 1950s. Inflation stopped immediately, shortages vanished, 
39Quoted in Gareth Smyth, "Lack of Direction in Iraq Stunts Business 
Growth," Financial Times, July 9, 2004. 
'
0Quoted in Gareth Smyth, "Lack of Direction in Iraq Stunts Business 
Growth," Financial Times,July 9, 2004. 
''.Jonathan Kallmer, "Marshall Plan Principles Model for Rebuilding Iraq," 




trade flourished and for more than a decade, the West German 
economy grew much faster than that of the United States. '2 
In fact, the Bush Administration has drawn a number of historical 
analogies between Germany and Iraq'3 and in so doing appears to be 
sending several messages: First, that the Iraq war was a noble cause, as 
noble as fighting the Nazis. Second, that the rebuilding will be lengthy, 
costly and complicated. And third, that despite the difficulties, the 
United States 'can be successful in Iraq, just as it was ultimately su:cess-
ful in Germany. 44 
As noted, the West German reforms bear some resemblance to those 
undertaken by the CPA The massive U.S. led reconstruction and aid 
effort also brings back memories of the Marshall Plan for post-war 
reconstruction in Europe. However Germany recovered as fully as it 
did, in large part, because the country had substantial experience with 
capitalism and, though more briefly, demo~racy. . It was a Western 
nation long before Hitler; it required only a restoration, not a transfor-
mation to establish a modern self-sustaining economy. The same can-
not be said of Iraq before Saddam.45 
To its credit, the Bush Administration through its greater Middle East 
Initiative appears to recognize that Iraq is only one part of a larger prob-
lem. As Condoleezza Rice has noted: "U.S. troops will not need to be 
in Iraq as long as they have been in Germany, now almost 60 years, but 
the United States will need to engage broadly throughout the region 
economically, diplomatically and culturally. We must have the patience 
and perseverance to see it through. "46 
The enormity of the task can be easily seen from the statistics. Over 
the past 20 years, the average per capita growth rate in the Arab world 
'
2Alan Reynolds, "National Prosperity is no Mystery," Orbis 40:2 (Spring 
1996), p. 200. ,, . 
'
3Robin Wright, "Rice Likens Iraq to Postwar Germany, Los Angeles Times, 
August 8, 2003, AlO. . 
'"'Faye Bowers, "What Lessons Postwar Germany Holds for Iraq: Bush Aides 
See Parallels, urging Patience, but Others Note a Difference - More 
Fighting," The Christian Science Monitor, September 3, 2002, p. 2. 
'
5Fred Kaplan, "Iraq's Not Germany: What a 60-Year-Old Allen Dulles 
Speech can Teach us About Postwar Reconstruction," Slate, October 17, 2003. 
'
6Quoted in Robin Wright, "Rice Likens Iraq to Postwar Germany," Los 




has been less than 1 percent, lower than that of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Official unemployment rates are in double digits, and likely underesti-
mate the problem. Labor productivity in the 1990s was the same as it 
was in the 1970s. In ranking of everything from exports to technological 
development and access to foreign literature and ideas, the Middle East 
is the world's weakest region, and falling further behind. In the 1950s, 
per capita income in Egypt was similar to that of South Korea, but it is 
now 80 percent lower. In the past 20 years, Egyptians, with a population 
of 70 million, filed 77 patents in the United States. The 50 million South 
Koreans filed 16,328. Today, non-oil exports of Hungary exceed those 
of all Arab countries combined.47 
Future Areas of Reform 
The reforms often suggested for the Middle East by U.S. officials, fall 
into two broad categories: {a) those intended to develop efficient mar- f, · 
ket-based economies, with increased economic freedom, and (b) those':, 




Both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal's Index o('. 
" 
::.,;,1 
Economic Freedom48 and the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of::· 
the World'9 provide good measures of the relative progress made . by: . 
countries in moving to a deregulated, limited government, free-marke~ . 
environment Because the Heritage Foundation data set included mon;'. '. 
of the Middle Eastern countries it was used for the analysis that follows~ . 
The Heritage Index reflects the absence of government constraint oif 
coercion on the production, distribution or consumption of goods and ·~· ' 
services. Stripped to its essentials, economic freedom is concerned witl( ·, 
property rights and choice. To mea.Sure economic freedom the Herirage, 
"'!"t'' 
"'ii··· 
. '<::~ . 
'Jeffrey Garten, "Chinese Lessons: The Best Way to Deliver on Bush's Call ~f '. 
for Freedom in the Middle East May be Found in the China Model," ,i 
Newsweek, November 24, 2003, p. 54. ,,;:x 
'
8See for ex.ample Marc Miles, Edwin Feulner and Mary Anastasia O'Grady,}lf 
and Ana Eiras, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: Heritage ·~, 
Foundation, 2004). ,~,,;( 
'
9Available from Global Economic Software, Ltd., <www.globaleconomicsoft:::f · 
ware.com>. See Cf. Robert Looney, "Iraq's Economic Transition: The )~'._ 
Neoliberal l\1odel and its Role," The Middle Eastjournal, 57:4 (Autumn 2003), f 








Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index takes ten different factors into 
account: 
I. Trade Policy 
2. Fiscal Burden of Government 
3. Government Intervention in the Economy 
4. Monetary Policy 
5. Banking and Finance 
6. Capital Flows and Foreign Investment 
7. Wages and Prices 
8. Property Rights 
9. Regulation 
10. Informal Market 
Implied in these measure~ is the notion that economic freedom also 
requires governments to refrain from many activities. They must refrain 
from actions that interfere with personal ch9ice, voluntary exchange, 
and the freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. 
Economic freedom is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, 
and regulations are substituted for personal choice, voluntary exchange 
and market coordination. Restrictions that limit entry into occupations 
and business activities also retard economic freedom. 
· The index pr~vides a framework for understanding most of the objec-
tives of U.S. reform efforts in the region: how open countries are to 
competition; the degree of state intervention in the economy whether 
through ta.Xation, spending or overregulation, and the strength and 
independence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules and protects pri-
vate property. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others 
may have freedom in just a few. One of the most important findings of 
research Carried out using the index is that economic freedom is 
required in all aspects of economic life. That is countries must score well 
in; all ten of the factors in order to improve their economic efficiency 
m<I consequently the living standards of their people.50 
;~~,f:,,1~:::: 
Governance 
'.~::711e ·other main area of U.S. reform efforts, democracy and gover-
nanee are increasingly seen as essential for long run economic growth 
JOAna Isabel Eiras, Ethics, Corruption and Economic Freedom (Heritage 









and prosperity. In fact some dimensions of governance now sit at the , .. 
center of academic and policy discussions of economic development.51 
While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress 
in attaining improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent 
World Bank study52 provides a set of rankings incorporating the full 
extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon. More precisely, the 
World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of gov-
ernance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 
2002. 
Voice and Accountability. This variable measures various aspects of 
the political process, civil liberties. and political rights. These indicators . : j 
measure the extent to which the citizens of a country are able to partic-
ipate in the selection of governments. Also included in this variable are 
indicators measuring the independence of the m~a. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence. This governance 
cluster combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or 
overthrown. 
Government Effectiveness.""This variable combines aspects of the 
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from 
political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to policies. 
Regulatory Quality. This .~ect of governance is more focused on. ··.j: 
the policies themselves. It inCirides measures of the incidence of mar- ! 
ket-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank super- . : 
vision as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive reg-
ulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. 
Rule of Law. Included in this dimension of governance are several 
indicators which measure the extent to which the citizens of a country 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include per-
ceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. 
Control of Corruption. This dimension of governance measures 
perceptio~ of corruption. By this measure corruption is defined as the 
51Herbert Kitschelt, "A Review of the Political Economy of Governance," 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3315, May 2004, p. 1. 
52Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: 





exercise of public power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a 
lack of respect of both the corrupter and the corrupted ~or the rules 
which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of gov-
ernance. 
As a whole, the Greater Middle East Initiative countries have lagged 
nsiderably behind other major groupings of countries (Table 1). The 
co . 53 
high growth (so-called "catching-up") developing. countries -
Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico etc. have made considerably !11?re 
rogress in nearly all of the major areas of reform. In turn there ts a ~omparable but generally smaller gap between. the various reform 
measures of the catching-up and advanced countries. 
The reform gap between the Great~r Middle East Initi~tive {GM~I) 
countries and those catching up to the advanced econormes are partic-
ularly evident in the main dimensions of governai_ice {lower values in 
Table 1 represent a worsening of governance). While the gaps betwe~n 
the GMEI countries and the catching up countries are not as great m 
the economic freedom area, they are still fairly consistent {higher values . 
in Table 1 for these variables signifies a worsening of economic free-
dom) across all ten dimensions with the exception of monetary policy. 
Fmally, the standard deviations of nearly all reform dimensi~~s ~e 
relatively high across ·the board for the Greater Middle East lnitiativ: 
countries. This suggests considerably more diversity of reform expen-
ences within this group of countries relative to those found in the catch-
ing up and advanced economies. 
A Conceptual Framework 
The various dimensions of economic freedom and governance pro-
vide a good gauge of the progress made by Iraq and the GMEI coun-
tries in reforming their economies and political systems. However, to 
fully appreciate the contribution made by these reforms, one needs to 
see them in a broader context. Which combinations and levels of 
reforms appear to be associated with movements to higher levels of 
development and modernization? Which reform strategies appear most 
53As defined in Jeffrey Sachs, "Globalization and Patterns of Economic . 
Development," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136:4 {20?0}, p. 5~1. Sachs considers 
these countries to be narrowing the income gap with the higher technolo?J' 
and richer countries through a process of technological diffusion and capital 
flows from the leader to follower. 
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efficient in placing a country on the path to sustainable levels of pros- : · 
perity? \: 
In the case of Iraq, although post-war Germany appears to offer few 
policy insights,54 several models are available to provide guidance for 
reform strategies. Each has its limitations however: 
I. The economic development literature is replete with "success sto-
ries" Iraq might consider emulating.55 However, while applicable to 
a wide variety of situations confronting Iraq most of these develop-
ment models, the East Asia Model for example, seem inappropriate 
because Iraq faces far greater challenges than those countries at the 
start of their transformations: .Iraq not only needs to emerge from 
decades of poverty, but also needs to rebuild after decades of vio-
lent conflict. 
2. The literature on failed states56 and post-conflict reconstruction is 
therefore also relevant to the Iraqi case,57 but here Iraq differs from 
most post conflict countries in that it has, at least potentially, its own 
independent and abundant source of funding in the form of oil rev-
enues. 
3. Oil economies however have their own set of problems. The oil 
economy or "rentier state" literature addresses many of the issues 
specific to Iraq's situation,58 but one would be hard pressed to find 
a "success story" that might be emulated by the Iraqis. The only suc-
cess story of note is Norway, a country of few similarities to Iraq. In 
fact rentier economies like)raq have tended to be some of the worst 
performers in the world economy, falling further and further behind 
their less well endowed neighbors. 
4. A final area of potentially useful literature is that of the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the republics of · 
5'Cf. Douglas Porch and George Cornewall Lewis, "Occuptational Hazzards: 
Myths of 1945 and U.S. Iraq Policy," 17ze National Interest, Issue 72 {Summer 
2003). 
55Much of which is summarized in Dani Rodrik, "Understanding Economic 
Policy Re~orm," journal of Ecorwmic Literature, XX.IV {March 1996), pp. 9-41. 
56Ralph Peters, "Spotting the Losers: Seven Signs of Non-Competititve 
States," Parameters {Spring 1998), pp. 36-47. 
5John Lampe, "The Lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo for Iraq," Current History 
(March 2004), pp. 113-118. 
58Robert Lo?ney, "Iraq's Future: Will Oil be a Blessing or Curse?" 17ze Midd/,e 
East Business and Economic Review, 16:1 Qune 2004), pp. 15-29. 
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the former Soviet Union. While Iraq was not a Communist country, 
this literature59 does provide insights into the problems encountered 
by Iraq in moving from a centrally planned e~~nomy to ~at of a 
market-driven country. Several of the transition countries also 
experienced periods of conflict, while others do have abundant oil 
revenues. 60 
Most importantly, the transition economies appear to be spli: int~ ~o 
groups - one that has achieved a large measure of success m c~tical 
areas of the economy, and another that has not been able to make major 
strides in this regard. Certainly these countries are far more relevant to 
Iraq than postwar Germany and Japan-countries that were rich, indus-
trialized and war torn, not backward and war tom. 61 This fact was not 
lost on the CPA who in September of 2003 invited Yegor Gaidar {along 
with other transition state experts), architect of many of the Russian 
reforms in the early :1990s, to Baghdad for. discussions over possible 
reform strategies in Iraq.62 
For his part, Gaidar noted a number of similarities - the fundamental 
problem in the Soviet Union, Russia in 1991, and in I~q.in 200~ was a 
"total collapse of the political institutions of the totalitarian regune. _In 
both places, for all the gravity of economic problems, they were den;-
atives of the fact that there was a certain rigid structure: the CPSU m 
the Soviet Union and the Baath party in Iraq that permeated all the ele-
ments of the state machinery. "63 
59Cf, Pradeep Mitra and Marcelo Selowsky, "Less?ns fr~m ";, D:cade of 
Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Umon, Finance & 
Development, 39:2 Qune 2002) and Stanley Fischer, "The ~ransition 
Economies After Ten Years," National Bureau of Econormc Research 
Working Paper 7664 {April 2000). . .. 
600leh Havrylyshyn, "Recovery and Growth m Transition: ~ Decade of 
Evidence," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 48: Special Issue {2001), 
pp. 53-87. . . ' 
6 jeffrey Garten, "Chinese Lessons: The Best W~y to Deli;er on Bus~ s Call 
for Freedom in the Middle East May be Found m the China Model, 
Newsweek, November 24, 2003, p. 54. . . . . 
62Yegor Gaidar, Director of the Institute for the Ec~normes m Transition, 
interview broadcast on the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 
September 9, 2003. . . . . 
63Yegor Gaidar, Director of the Institute for the Ec~nonues m Transition, 
interview broadcast on the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 




' i The Empirical Dimension , i determine if the transition countries were "correctly" grouped. That is, 
In short, Gaidar elevated reforms in governance to just as an impor- is it possible for the six governance and ten economic freedom variables 
tant level as those reforms directly affecting the workings of the econo- : :, described above to define two sets (corresponding to the successful and 
my. The issue then became one of identifying those governance and unsuccessful transition economies) of unique reform environments? If 
economic reforms that appear to be critical in the transformation this is the case, countries possessing a particular set of reform attain-
process. ments would be classified with a high degree of probability in one of 
The first step in this regard was to identify the successful and unsuc- these groups. As part of its analysis, the discriminate procedure also 
cessful transition countries. By most accounts, 64 the former communist generate a rniinerical function, the discriminant function, indicati1!g for 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, together with the Baltic States each country the extent to which critical areas of reform would have to 
and several Balkan countries have experienced successful transitions, be improved if the country were to advance (or regress) to the other 
while most of the former Soviet Union countries have not Tentatively, group. The main results of this analysis are summ.~ed in Fi~e 1. 
fourteen countries were grouped in the unsuccessful {Low Transition The discriminate analysis confirmed67 that our 1mtial pre-assignment 
Group, Table 2) while 11 were assigned to the successful (High of the transition countries was correct-- all of the countries in the sam-
Transition Group, Table 2). Using the same set of reform variables as ple were placed in identical groups by the program. The probability of 
the previous comparison (Table 1), a number of sharp differences correct placement was also extremely high. 
appear between the two sets of transition countries across the whole Finally out of the sixteen reform/governance variables the discrimi-
spectrum of governance and economic reforms. nant program found three - (1) Rule of Law, (2) Fiscal Burden and (3). 
These differences in reform attainment appear to be associated with a Property Rights to be critically important in defining the two groups of 
number of economic perforillance variables (bottom, Table 2). In par- reform environments. Fiscal burden was no doubt significant simply 
ticular the successful transition countries have average per capita . because it was the one area of reforms in which the low transition group 
incomes roughly four times that of the unsuccessful group of countries. actually scored higher than the high transition countries. 
The successful countries have been able to contain private consump-; The picture does not change fundamentally when a group of 14 poor 
tion, diverting these resources to government programs. They have performing Greater Middle East Initiative countries were added to the 
higher investment rates and.have attracted. considerably more private low transition group (Table 3). Again, with the exception of the fiscal 
capital flows. Trade also accounts for a much higher percentage burden, the low GMEI/Transition group lags considerably in their rel-
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the successful transition countries - ative reform efforts. While average per capita income gap between this 
they are more open to international market forces and have been able expanded low group is a little less than little less than that between the 
to establish competitive industries in the international environment. two groups of transition countries, the other economic structure differ-
A statistical technique, discriminant analysis65 was then performed66 to ences are roughly comparable with the high group investing more, hav-
wSee for example, Erik Berglof and Patrick Bolton, "The Great Divide and 
Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition," journal of Economic Perspectives, 
16: 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 77-100, and Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, 
"Deten:niilants of Growth in Transition Countries," Finance & Development, 
36:2 (June 1999). 
65 A discussion of this technique together with several examples is given in: 
"Discriminant Analysis," in SPSS Base 70.0 User's Guide, (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 
1999), pp. 315-322. 
'";Based on the data sets, the period of analysis was 1995-2002. 
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ing an expanded public sector, attracting considerably more foreign pri-
vate investment and much more engaged in international trade. 































































. The assumption that our sample of G MEI countries, including Iraq 
before the March 2003 conflict, was roughly similar in reform progress 
to the low transition group was confirmed by the discriminant analysis.68 
As in the previous discriminate exercise, all of the group pre-assign-
ments were confirmed. However, reflecting the democracy deficit in 
the Middle East, voice was now the most important reform variable sep-. 
arating the two groupings of countries. In descending order of signifi-
cance statically fiscal burden, wages and prices and informal markets 






completed defining the group environments. 
Comparing just the sample of GMEI countries with those of the high 
transition group produced a similar pattern of relative reform attain-
ment (Table 4). While the Middle East countries scored higher on mon-
etary policy and were comparable on the fiscal burden, they lagged 
considerably behind the successful transition countries in all other areas 
of reform. In addition they lagged even further behind the other low 
groupings in ·the critical areas of p~vate ca~ital flows an~ ~de: J~r 
these two groups of countries a senes of variables were Sigmficanf m 
their differentiation. In declining order of importance those variables 
were voice, government effectiveness, political stability, informal mar-
kets, rule of law, foreign investment and regulation. Given the fact that 
all of the GMEI countries were classified with a 100 percent probabili-
ty of being in the low group significant progress would have to be made 
in all of these areas for the G MEI countries to reach the level of devel-
opment attained by the successful transformation countries. 
In sum, our sample of GMEI countries (UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman appear further along the reform path and were thus omitted from 
the analysis) show many similarities to the low transition group of coun-
tries. Progress across a wide range of key reform areas has lagged con-
siderably behind other parts of the world. What progress might have 
been made in some individual areas was apparently not sufficient pro-
pel similar attempts at broader based reforms. For the GMEI countries, 
the lack of voice is no doubt responsible for much of the sad state of 
reforms with the democracy deficit setting this group of countries a bit 
apart from the low transition countries. 
A Reform Strategy 
While the discriminant analysis above identified several key areas 
upon which Iraq and the G MEI countries will have to focus if they are 
ever to attain the economic status of the high transition group of coun-
tries, its main limitation is that it was static - focusing on one point in 
time (averages over the 1996-2002 period). As such, this exercise does 
not shed much light on the critical issues of the sequencing of reforms -
should governance precede economic reforms? If so which ones? 
69This, along with all of the other empirical results noted in the paper is avail-




However, the literature is beginning to form a consensus in this area. 70 
The shock therapy approach tried initially in Iraq71 and in many of the 
transition countries has fallen into great disfavor. 72 In its place most 
experts advocate some sort of gradual approach whereby one set of 
reforms creates pressures/incentives for another set of reforms and so 
on.73 
Based on the results above and with the CPA reforms as the starting 
point for further market based and governance reforms, it's possible to 
visualize a virtuous circle of growth and reform gaining traction in a 
manner similar to many of the successful transitions in Eastern Europe.7• 
None of this will just occur automatically. Progress will require the 
Iraqi government to shift from an expenditures/reconstruction mindset 
to a reform/ development/ growth orientation. Clearly some reforms 
will be more effective than others in lifting to a path of high sustained 
growth. The analysis above suggests that voice, government effective-
ness, political stability, informal markets, rule oflaw, foreign mires:UIJlen 
and regulation will be critical. Interestingly, the three most rmpo1rtaJ1t 
are in the area of governance, w.ith economic variables assuming a less-
er, but still important role ill'..·advancing Iraq and the GMEI countries 
along the reform path to a higher level of transition.75 
Of course sustaining reforms is easier said than done. Many transi-
tion countries have experienced stalled reforms after several years 
productive liberalization and institution building. As with the transition 
economies, the reform process-in Iraq can take the country in one 
'l<lSee for example David Ellerman, "Lessons of the Post-Socialist Transition 
for the Iraqi Economic Transformation," Testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee,June 11, 2003. 
11Cf. Robert Looney, "The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's 
Economic Transition," Middle Eastjourna~ 57:4 (Autumn 2003), pp.568-586, 
and Robert Looney, "The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq," 
forthcoming, Challenge (September/October 2004). 
12George Stiglitz, "Whether Reform: Ten Years of Transformation," Keynote 
Address World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics {April 
28-30, 1999). 
73Juhani Laurila and Rupinder Singh, "Sequential Reform Strategy," Russian 
and East European Finance and Trade, 37:3 (May:June 2001), pp. 25-76. 
7"Cf. Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, "Determinants of Growth in 
Transition Countries," Finance & Development, 36:2 Qune 1999), pp.12-15. 
75Cf. Robert _Looney, "The Broader Middle East Initiative: Requirements for 





two directions. Through their past reform efforts, some Eastern 
European/Baltic countries are close to being predo~inantly mark:t 
economies. They have experienced a healthy sustained economic 
revival and have met or are close to meeting the conditions for mem-
bership in the European Union (EU). In contrast many other. transition 
economies, who started their reform process at the same time, have 
implemented reforms to the extent they no longer have socialist 
economies, but are still struggling to develop their private sector, :om-
plete the liberation of prices, establish market institutions, rationalize 
government activity and impose an effective rule o~law.76 • 
Why has one group of countries succeeded while the other failed? 
The recent literature on reforms in transition countries stresses the 
problem of rent seeking a:rid vested Interests. These are groups w~o 
benefit financially from the exiting state of affairs and have a financial 
incentive to block further reform. One can already see these groups 
beginning in Iraq, especially workers in the state enterprises, paid 
excessively high salaries, with no real incentive to work. Many of those 
receiving subsidized energy, food etc. are making good profits by sell-
ing these products in the black markets of neighboring countries. No 
doubt there are many other instances of individuals or groups benefit-
ing from the current incompleteness of Iraqi reform efforts. The more 
numerous and entrenched these groups and individuals become, the 
greater the obstacles to advancing reforms in Iraq. 
To offset these groups, Iraqi reformers will have to begin creating their 
own groups of winners - individuals and groups that can see the success 
of their efforts as well as the link between the reforms and their success. 
In the Eastern European countries these groups have often been work-
ers and entrepreneurs associated with new small and medium-sized 
businesses. This is where most of the new jobs will have to be created 
in Iraq. It is also the reason why a top economic priority should be the 
health and vitality of the country's financial system. The CPA reforms 
. have laid the foundation for the system, but much work remains. 
Although the CPA reforms do no appear to be an impediment to the 
economy's recovery, sooner.or later the Iraqis will have to implement a 
development strategy focused on diversifying the economy away from 
"'Olen Havrylyshyn and John Odling-Smee, "Political Economy of Stalled 




the oil sector. At that time, many of the reforms in place today will have 
to be modified so that they are consistent with the encouragement of a 
broad based industrial structure and provide for a diversified source of 
revenues for the government. While the current no tariff policy is use-
ful in allowing a clearer identification of the country's comparative 
advantage outside of the energy sector, temporary tariffs will have to be 
enacted to facilitate infant industry development. Also the tax system 
will have to be revamped to enable the authorities to better shift 
resources in desired directions and offset oil price fluctuations. 
Final Observations 
Understandably, there is a strong resistance in the Arab world in gen-
eral and Iraq in particular against reform being imposed from an exter-
nal power. There is also great skepticism in many Arab quarters con-
cerning the efficacy of markets in allocating resources in the national 
interest. The Iraqi experience to date with reforms suggests a number 
of les8ons the United ~es and other like minded countries will have 
to absorb before significant }P,eaningful reforms can take place in the 
region: 
1. Although textbook economics provide a number of guidelines for 
· reform, the actual reforms should be homegrown and should take 
into consideration internal conditions, national objectives and limi-
tations of the individual countries. 
2. Care should be taken -~.that reform efforts are not undermined 
by poor macroeconomic policymaking. Governmental actions 
should consciously take economic ramifications into account. 
3. While adequate financing reforms are essential in many cases, it 
is more important to change attitudes - people need to see how they 
are benefiting from the reforms. 
4. In tum the beneficiaries of reform will place pressure on the 
authorities for further reform. In this regard, the sequencing of 
reforms will be critical in assuring that the reform process will not 
become stalled. 
5. Ecmiomic reforms will be unsuccessful in permanently improv-
ing standards of living in the region unless there is a fundamental 
change in attitudes towards markets and competition. 
Perhaps Henry Azzarn best sums up this last point: 
Allowing markets to prevail requires having a set of cultural values 
28 
that emphasize the virtue of competition, the ability to create and 
gain in a socially acceptable way, the legitimacy of profits and the 
importance of freedom of transaction. Spreading a market culture in 
the region is therefore not only an exercise in economic restructur 
ing but also an acceptance of the basic values and standards that 
make the system work. 77 
r.Henry T. Azzaro, "Changing the Legacy of Failure in the 
Arab World," Arab News, May 17, 2004. 
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Table: 1 
Greater Middle East Initiative Countries Governance-Economic Freedom Group 
Comparisons 
(1996-2002 Averages) 
Voice Political Government Regulatory Rule Control of 
Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption 
Gr~ater Middle Ea!!t lnitisitive Qountries {20 Countries} 
Mean -0.91802 -0.37126 -0.17018 -0.41027 -0.01853 -0.17146 
Std. Deviation 0.470583 0.989188 0.720173 1.096394 0.859818 0.673571 
Catchino-UQ Economi~ {~7 Countries} 
Mean 0.48504 0.35871 0.28211 0.46249 0.26696 0.15342 
Std. Deviation 0.561143 0.622755 0.511180 0.415176 0.521825 0.544002 
Agvanced Economies {2~ Countries} 
Meao 1.27878 1.15325 1.70471 1.34893 1.74568 1.84731 •i 
' 
Std. Deviation 0.396079 0.446343 0.373612 0.288472 0.331339 0.443233/ ! 
Trade Fiscal Government Mone1ary Foreign 
Policy Burden Intervention Policy Investment 
Greater Middle !;;sist lnitiativ~ Countries {2Q Count!.i§} 
Mean 3.87135 3.55462 3.47632 2.46959 3.22105 
Std. Deviation 1.131846 0.886989 0.765516 1.435857 0.987222 
Catchioo-!.!Q J;;conomi~ {~7 Coontries) 
Mean 3.16592 3.39094 2.49234 3.10698 2.51254 
Std. Deviation 0.953574 '0.648153 0.598365 0.955559 0.498750 
Advanced Economies {212 Countri~) 
Mean 1.94089 4.01658 2.45400 1.27189 1.90178 
Std. Deviation 0.289542 0.797321 0.588025 0.364115 0.531872 
Banking & Wages& Property Regulation Informal 
Finance "Prices Rights Market 
!:?reat~r Middle East Initiative Countries (2Q Countries} 
Mean 3.35380 3.12339 3.06491 3.27302 3.37690 
Std. Deviation 1.053723 0.830339 
Qsi!\<hing:UQ Economies {~7 Countrle§} 
1.186112 0.834108 1.367260 
Mean 2.76156 2.59512 2.66494 3.12830 3.27387 
Std. Deviation 0.585669 0.570191 0.805735 0.714370 0.783671 
Advanced Economies {2~ Countri~) 
Mean 2.00000 2.07278 1.24044 2.42633 1.37444 
Std. Deviation 0.745632 0.329991 0.409115 0.609504 0.585709 
Notes: Governance data, Average Values 1996-2002, Economic Freedom data, 
Average Values 1995-2004. Source: Compiled from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters Ill: Governance Indicators for 
1996-2002, (Washington: World Bank, June 30, 2003), and Index of Economic 
Freedom Rankings, (Washington: Heritage Foundation, various issues). 
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Table: 2 . 
Transition Economies: Governance, Economic Freedom Group Comparisons 
(1996-2002 averages) 
Voice 
1,ow Tmtisition GfQ!.!12 (14 QQY!lml 
Mean -0.69891 
Std. Deviation 0.513940 
t1jgb Transition Grot1Q {11 Countries) 
Mean 0.72428 
Std. Deviation 0.355024 
Trade 
Policy 
1,QYt Transition Grouo {14 Countries} 
Mean 3.75816 
Std. Deviation 0.847439 
High T!'.S!D.!!itiQn Grouo {11 Countries} 
Mean 2.65202 
Std. Deviation 0.775195 
Banking & 
Finance 
low Transition Groi.m {14 Countries) 
Mean 3.60692 
Std. Deviation 0.860035 
H!gh Transition GrouQ {11 Countries) 
Mean 2.42525 
Std. Deviation .615481 




low TrlID!!ition Group {14 Qountries} 
Mean 1013.97 
Std. Deviation 788.88 
H"tqh Tran§ltion GrooQ {11 Countries) 
Mean 4099.96 
Std. Deviation 2632.51 
Notes: Da1a Sources, See Table 1. 
Political Government Regulatory Rule Control of 
Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption 
-0.42884 -0.77023 -0.87185 -0.79721 -0.83539 
0.555638 0.307984 0.657388 0.281156 0.211557 
0.69484 0.30359 0.56790 0.34155 0.,20858 
0.249563 0.432893 0.374831 0.370138 0.421502 
Fiscal Government Monetary Foreign 
Burden Intervention Poficy Investment 
3.29596 3.16706 4.36315 3.38322 
0.584254 0.441332 0.740221 ·0.650677 
3.96588 2.50404 • 3.73965 2.26338 
0.357896 0.437791 0.740233 0.461220 
Wages& Property Regulation Informal 
Prices Rights Market 
3.42562 3.74921 3.97222 4.49433 
0.636028 0.373320 0.387452 0.393646 
2.56338 2.81035 3.04672 3.26515 
0.535783 0.695351 0.692023 0.404024 
Private Public Investment Private Trade 
Consumpt Consumpt Capital Flows 
(%GDP) (%GDP) (%GDP) (%GDP) (%GDP) 
72.31199 15.40061 22.39315 13.35154 72.52454 
14.811718 4.511183 5.697611 5.624283 28.815698 
62.01956 18.68349 24.79063 18.59334 88.67385 








Mlddle East Economies Grouped with Low Transition Economies: Governance, Economic 
Freedom Group Comparisons wtth High Transition Group 
(1996-2002 averages) 
Voice Political Government Regulatory Rule 
Stability Effectiveness Quality Law 
Control of ·' 
Corruption 
,~· 
----~--c::-::-::----:-:--:---------------- c. !.Qlt! T!l!~itioalME GrQYQ {28 Countries) 
Mean -0.88220 -0.57813 -0.62803 -0.82372 -0.60846 




l::lioh Transition ~rQYQ {11 Countries) 
Mean 0.72428 0.69484 0.30359 0.56790 0.34155 
j\~ 
! ~ 
.20858 ~ ; 
Std. Deviation 0.355024 0.249563 0.432893 0.374831 0.370138 .421502 
Trade Fiscal Government Monetary Foreign 
Policy Burden Intervention Policy Investment 
low Tri:!nsltion/Mf; Gmim (28 Countries) 
Mean 4.17681 3.63688 3.38101 3.66151 3.40391 
Std. Deviation 0.785600 0.668271 0.653831 1.298274 0.871453 
Hioh T ram!it!Qn GrOUQ ! 11 Countries l 
Mean 2.65202 3.96586 2.50404 3.73965 2.26338 
Std. Deviation o.ns195 .. · <f357896 o.43n91 0.740233 0.461220 
Banking & Wages& Property Regulation lnfonnal 
Finance Prices Rights Market 
! 
LQY! Transition/ME ~fOYQ (28 Countries} 
Mean 3.67494 3.40743 3.74325 3.82375 4.25510 
Std. Deviation 0.906342 0.766259 0.734270 0.629045 o.n9337 
High Transition GrouQ {11 Countries} 
Mean 2.42525 '2.56338 2.81035 3.04672 3.26515 
Std. Deviation 0.615481 0.535783 0.695351 0.692023 0.404024 
Economic Structure Variables 
_______ P_e_r Ca_pita _____ P_riv_at_e--P-ubtic-. --lnv-e-st_men_. t--:P=-nv.,..· -at:--e----=r=-r-ade-=--- F · 
Income Consumpt Consumpt Capital Flows ~;. 
($) (%GDP) (%GDP) (%GDP) (%GOP) (%GDP) ~ '.: 
-~'.1»'4 ; _!._Qlt!_T-~-iti-.on/M--E-Gf-oup--(-28-Qountries ___ -}----------------- ·~·.~. 
Mean 1341.33 68.73104 15.53526 22.05540 10.98818 62.668sG~j '.: 
Std. Deviation 1487.05 13.922040 5.173162 4.999747 6.523658 26.4761~ 1 
High Transition GrouQ (11 Countries} 
Mean 4099.96 62.01956 18.68349 24.79063 18.59334 88.67385>~ '.• 
s~. Deviation 2632.51 7.124784 5.228647 4.449303 6.818769 27.136595_~' 
···~: 
_N_ot_es_:_D,_a_ta_Sou-rce_s_, S-e-e...,T=-a.,.b.,..le-1.,.._-Sa=--m-pl.,.e-o...,f"'M-id.,.d""'"le-=Eas-t-cou-n.,..trie.,.., -s-p-re-gro--uped--:--with-::-. ,-.,-low--- ; ~ 








MiQdle Emit ~YR {1~ Countrie~) 
Mean - ... 1.09236 
Std. Deviation 0.502216 
HiOh Transitlon Group (11 Countries) 
Mean 0.72428 
Std. Deviation 0.355024 
Trade 
Policy 
M~ e~ Grouo !13 Countries} 
Mean 4.66325 
Std. Deviation 0.363295 
t!l!tl Transition ~Q!.!Q ! 11 QQl.!ntries} 
Mean 2.65202 
Std. Deviation o.n5195 
Banking & 
Finance 
Middle Eafil Grouo {13 Countries) 
Mean 3.73419 
Std. Deviation 1.017354 
t!!gh Transition GrouQ {11 Countries) 
Mean 2.42525 
Std. Deviation 0.615481 




Mjdc!le East Group (13 Countries) 
Mean 1757.93 
Std. Deviation 2092.455350 
Hklh Transffinn ~ {11 Countries) 
Mean 4099.96 
Std. Deviation 2632.515505 
Notes: Data Sources, See Table 1. 
Political Government Regulatory Rule Control of 
Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption 
-0.74890 -0.46440 -0.74238 -0.39551 -.44610 
0.947339 0.691158 0.968601 0.714316 ~497937 
0.69484 0.30359 0.56790 0.34155 .20858 
0.249563 0.432893 0.374831 0.370138 .421502 
Fiscal Government Monetary Foreign 
Burden Intervention Poficy Investment 
3.97060 3.53632 2.98974 . 3.38034 
0.602528 0.769365 1.427086 1.104239 
3.96588 2.50404 3.73965 2.26338 
0.357896 0.437791 0.740233 0.461220 
Wages& Property Regulation Informal 
Prices Rights Market 
3.37521 3.64017 3.57338 3.94017 
0.937602 0.958614 0.720257 0.989064 
2.56338 2.81035 3.04672 326515 
0.535783 0.695351 0.692023 0.404024 




(%GDP) (%GDP) (%GDP) 
64.55328 15.69235 21.21573 7.05360 49.65372 
12.on102 6.059780 4.148001 4.911575 18.358790 
62.01956 18.68349 24.79063 16 .. 59334 88.67385 
7.124784 5.228647 4.449303 6.818769 27.136595 
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